Global Security Newswire: Emergency Readiness Said Lacking at U.S. Nuclear Sites
Emergency preparedness and continuity of operations programs at U.S. Energy Department facilities suffer from "significant weaknesses" that could endanger lives and federal property, the DOE Inspector General's Office said in a report issued this week (see GSN, Aug. 16, 2010).
The National Nuclear Security Administration and other department offices have yet to fully implement recommendations put forward in 2004 for improving emergency readiness at key facilities, including the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, according to the new report.
"Despite various corrective actions, the department had not fully resolved problems in emergency preparedness planning," it says.
Along with Los Alamos, the report also examines operations at the Hanford Site in Washington state and the Argonne National Laboratory and the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, both in Illinois.
"Notably, our review of 2009 emergency readiness reports disclosed that programs and sites had not
finally approved 105 of the 140 Hazards Surveys and 39 of the 74 Emergency Planning Hazards Assessments (EPHA) that were required -- actions necessary to accurately assess and respond to hazards," Inspector General Gregory Friedman wrote in an introductory memorandum to the report.
"Hazards Surveys, based largely on hazardous chemical inventories, are used to identify potential emergency conditions, while EPHAs analyze the potential consequences of a hazardous materials release," according to the auditors, who urged the department to make sure the reviews are "completed expeditiously."
Known emergency management shortcomings at three of the reviewed facilities had not been fully addressed, the report asserts, citing numerous exercises and reviews conducted over multiple years. The Los Alamos laboratory, for example, as of 2007 had not deployed precision technology for monitoring the spread of dangerous chemicals through its grounds.
Not all of the facilities had established systems for exchanging lessons learned, "and only Los Alamos used a site-wide lessons learned system," the report states.
Auditors faulted emergency management officials and other entities for failing to adequately ensure that contractors were meeting readiness standards. "Site offices had not always performed or effectively administered the contracts for which they were responsible to ensure actions designed to correct previously identified problems worked as planned," the report states. Contractors should be compelled to participate in the department's Corporate Lessons Learned System, it says.
"Without a robust review process, including reviewing drill and exercise reports, validating the completion of corrective actions and verifying their effectiveness, emergency management issues may not be fully addressed," investigators added.
Updated continuity of operations plans had not been prepared by more than half of the Energy Department entities required to submit such programs, according to the document. "As a consequence, significant requirements under the directive that were designed to address known program weaknesses, such as pandemic planning and demonstrating the ability to respond to a [continuity of operations] event through training, testing and exercising, had yet to be implemented," it states.
Continuity of operations program coordinators and responsible field-level parties had not exercised sufficient oversight of contractors and should be compelled to do so, the report's authors said.
"The department's ability to meet its primary national security mission-essential functions after a catastrophic event or disruption could be diminished if [continuity of operations] planning is ineffective," the report warns.
Energy Department and NNSA officials supported the report's recommendations with some reservations, according to the document (Global Security Newswire, Jan. 6).
No comments:
Post a Comment